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Executive Summary 
 
Financing remains one of the greatest challenges facing public parks and 
recreation managers in the United States.  Managers are confronted with the challenge of 
providing more services for a growing population with dwindling public financial support 
(Fretwell and Frost, 2006).  Adequate funding has been described as the most important 
factor in the delivery of recreation at the local level (Gladwell, Anderson, and Sellers, 
2003).  While public recreation funding originally came primarily from general tax 
revenues at the federal, state and local levels, shrinking appropriations over the last few 
decades have caused agency managers to experiment with alternative funding sources. 
 Much of the focus in recent years has been the increased utilization of user fees.  
User fees in parks and recreation areas vary from general (entrance into parks) to specific 
(camping fees or boat dock fees).  User fees have been shown to generate revenue and 
increase economic efficiency and equity, but opponents contend that they pose a 
disproportionate burden on low-income groups (More, 1999; Samnaliev, More, and 
Stevens, 2006; More and Stevens, 2000) and turn a public good meant for everybody into 
an excludable private good (Samnaliev, More, and Stevens, 2006). 
 In 2003, the State of Montana took an alternative approach by enacting an opt-out 
fee during vehicle registration to fund state parks.  Several other states, including 
California, Michigan, Arizona, and Washington, have experimented with a vehicle 
registration fee based on the Montana model.  The purpose of this study is to evaluate the 
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Montana opt-out fee to determine if it is a viable alternative funding solution to increase 
revenue, improve efficiency, and ensure equity in the provision of public recreation.  
Utilizing a case study approach, the origins of the opt-out fee, including the authorizing 
legislation, and budgetary implications are reviewed.  Since the literature on public 
recreation opt-out fees is limited, this analysis of the opt-out fee is conducted by utilizing 
public financing criteria from Mikesell (2007), including efficiency, equity, collection 
cost/simplicity, and revenue consequences.  These are operationalized for the public 
recreation context through themes from research on public recreation user fees.   
While the Montana opt-out fee raised significantly more revenue than previous 
sources, the Montana State Parks system continues to face financial challenges associated 
with rising operational costs.  Additionally, efficiency and equity were actually harmed 
when viewed from a user fee perspective.  However, collection cost/simplicity was 
improved through the opt-out fee.  The mixed results of the analysis coupled with the 
high performance of the revenue generating function of the fee suggest that the opt-out 
fee performs much differently than a typical public recreation user fee.   
While the revenue potential of an opt-out fee is apparent, further inquiry should 
be conducted to explore the fee from the perspectives of political feasibility and 
individual compliance with the voluntary fee.  In a difficult financial climate for state and 
local governments, the opt-out fee remains a potential independent funding stream for 
public recreation, but more studies are needed before the fee is adopted by multiple state 
parks programs.   
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Alternative Funding Mechanisms for Public Recreation:  
An Analysis of the Montana State Parks Opt-Out Fee 
 
Introduction 
Financing remains one of the greatest challenges facing public parks and 
recreation managers in the United States.  Managers are faced with the challenge of 
providing more services for a growing population with dwindling public financial support 
(Fretwell and Frost, 2006).  Adequate funding has been described as the most important 
factor in the delivery of recreation at the local level (Gladwell, Anderson, and Sellers, 
2003).  While public recreation funding originally came primarily from general tax 
revenues at the federal, state and local levels, shrinking appropriations over the last few 
decades have caused agency managers to experiment with alternative funding sources. 
 Much of the focus in recent years has been the increased utilization of user fees.  
User fees in parks and recreation areas vary from general (entrance into parks) to specific 
(camping fees or boat dock fees).  User fees have been shown to generate revenue and 
increase economic efficiency and equity, but opponents contend that user fees pose a 
disproportionate burden on low-income groups (More, 1999; Samnaliev, More, and 
Stevens, 2006; More and Stevens, 2000), and turn a public good meant for everybody 
into an excludable private good (Samnaliev, More, and Stevens, 2006). 
 In 2003, the State of Montana took an alternative approach and enacted an opt-out 
fee during vehicle registration to fund state parks.  Several other states, including 
California, Michigan, Arizona, and Washington, have experimented with a vehicle 
registration fee based on the Montana model.  The purpose of this study is to evaluate the 
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Montana opt-out fee to determine if it is a viable alternative funding solution to increase 
revenue, improve efficiency, and ensure equity in the provision of public recreation.  
Utilizing a case study approach, the origins of the opt-out fee, including the authorizing 
legislation, and budgetary implications are reviewed.  Since the literature on public 
recreation opt-out fees is limited, this analysis of the opt-out fee is conducted by utilizing 
public financing criteria from Mikesell (2007), including efficiency, equity, collection 
cost/simplicity and revenue consequences.  These are operationalized for the public 
recreation context through themes from research on public recreation user fees.   
Background and Literature Review 
 The period from the 1950s to 1970s saw a dramatic increase in parks and 
recreation services.  While federal legislation was adopted in the late 1950s to collect fees 
at federal sites, federal agencies did not use fees as a major source of funding due to the 
prevailing belief that parks should be open to all for free and user fees would negatively 
affect low-income groups. Traditionally, numerous parks that were open for free to the 
public required heavy support from general tax revenues.  However, high inflation and 
the rise of fiscal conservatism culminating in the “tax revolt” in the 1970s resulted in 
dwindling revenues for government programs, including parks and recreation (Bowker, 
Cordell and Johnson, 1999).   
 In the decades following the 1970s, the “anti-tax” sentiment continued to result in 
lower appropriations for parks and recreation.  Minnesota, Idaho, North Carolina, North 
Dakota, Ohio, South Carolina, Virginia, Arizona, and other states have seen a drastic 
decrease over the last few decades of appropriations from general tax revenue.  In fiscal 
year 2004, the Arizona State Park system, for example, was faced with a 63 percent 
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reduction in general fund support; previously, the largest percentage of state park revenue 
was from the general fund – 44 percent in fiscal year 2002 (Fretwell and Frost, 2006).  In 
response, public recreation managers have looked at alternative funding strategies 
including corporate sponsorships, private donations, privatization, the use of volunteers 
and user fees (Mowen et al., 2006).  Due to their large revenue generating potential as 
well as the public sentiment that those who benefit most from a service should bear most 
of the cost, user fees have emerged as a primary mechanism for raising revenue for parks 
and recreation.  
 
The Economics of User Fees 
 
 A general understanding of the utility of user fees is necessary to evaluate their 
appropriateness for parks and recreation systems.  The pricing of public goods through 
user fees has the potential to enhance both efficiency and equity.  The feasibility of user 
fees depends on the ability to identify and separate users from non-users, and set an 
appropriate price to account for externalities and transaction costs. 
 The coercion of taxation is necessary when funding non-rival, non-excludable 
public goods.  Where general taxes are “mandatory levies” tied to each individual’s 
economic capacity, user fees impose a cost on individuals or groups for the benefits they 
gain or services they use (Duff, 2004).  General taxes are coercive; user fees, in most 
cases, are voluntary.  While the voluntary collection of revenue might advance 
democratic values, coercion is needed to raise enough funds for government services 
(McGee, 1997).  For a “pure” public good, government services open to all (non-
excludable) where one individual’s use does not impact the use of another (non-rival), the 
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individual has no incentive to voluntarily pay for the service.  When a large number of 
individuals benefit from the provision of a pure public good (national defense, for 
example) and the costs are dispersed among all the members, the rational individual 
realizes his/her contribution of payment will be small and will not impact the provision of 
the good.  It makes more economic sense for the individual to opt-out of payment – the 
“free-rider” problem (Weimer and Vining, 2005).  Payment coercion through mandatory 
taxation is necessary to combat the “free-rider” problem and raise necessary funds for the 
provision of non-excludable, non-rival public goods. 
 However, the utilization of user fees is considered a preferred method for raising 
revenue when benefit/cost separability and exclusion is possible (Mikesell, 2007).  In 
developing a user fee, efficient pricing can only be set when the individuals or groups 
that benefit from the good can easily be identified.  If the good benefits society as a 
whole, inefficiency results when the users subsidize non-user benefits through the 
payment of a user fee.  A method for exclusion is also necessary to prevent the free-rider 
problem, as earlier indicated.  High administrative costs associated with an exclusion 
structure (staffing park entrances, for example) could negate any efficiency gains from 
the utilization of user fees.  Transaction costs are a major efficiency challenge in 
establishing user fees (Stiglitz, 2000; Weimer and Vining, 2005; Mikesell, 2007).  
Additionally, funds that depend on individual choice, rather than coercion, are less 
predictable (McGee, 1997).  Still, to the extent that benefit-cost separability and 
exclusion is assured, user fees have both equity and efficiency benefits.   
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Equity 
 User fees are the most equitable method for raising revenue because the user pays 
most of the cost of the good (Stiglitz, 2000; Duff, 2004; Mikesell, 2007).  The result is a 
“quasi-market” arrangement where individuals only pay for the services they benefit 
from and those who use the service the most bear a greater percentage of the cost burden 
(Mikesell, 2007).  Mikesell (2007) uses a motor fuel tax as an example of the equity 
enhancements of user fees.  Assume the revenue from a motor fuel tax goes to highway 
maintenance.  The more a person uses the highways, the more fuel is used and tax is paid.  
Those with the heaviest use make the highest payment.  If highway maintenance was 
funded through general tax revenues, non-users would also bear some of the cost.  As a 
user fee, the motor fuel tax increases equity by shifting the cost burden to the heaviest 
users and eliminates “cross-subsidization.”  Equity is also advanced with “close-
complementarity,” where there is a clear link between the fee and the government 
service.  Mikesell (2007) suggests that the elimination of cross-subsidization and the 
promotion of close-complementarity can also help mitigate anti-tax sentiment.   
Efficiency 
 Efficiency can be enhanced through the development of an appropriate pricing 
mechanism such as a user fee.  Under general taxation, individuals do not fully realize the 
cost of production; the marginal cost of an additional user or use is, in reality, zero.  As a 
result, individuals demand more than if they paid the full cost of production and 
undersupply could occur.  User fees connect individuals directly with the cost of 
production.  Externalities are internalized and managers are given the necessary 
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information to set the price at the marginal cost.  User fees also work to allocate scarce 
resources to the most valued users, defined by those willing to pay (Duff, 2004). 
 Efficiency is also enhanced by connecting agencies to public demand for service 
and improving operating efficiency (Mikesell, 2007; Duff, 2004).  Under general revenue 
financing, public managers have little information on public demand.  When information 
is available, managers have little incentive to respond to changing client preferences.  
User fees can legitimize (or delegitimize) public agencies by providing a record of public 
demand.  Also, user fees may improve the operations of agencies by making them more 
responsive to client needs.  However, efficiency gains can be lost if non-rival or non-
excludable public goods are priced.  
 Pricing non-rival goods can result in underconsumption (Stiglitz, 2000).  For rival 
goods, pricing can be utilized as a mechanism to limit congestion.  Where congestion is 
not an issue (an open highway), pricing can lead to underconsumption to the extent there 
are other options (a parallel, non-charged open highway)   Additionally, pricing non-
excludable goods leads to the “free-rider” problem where an individual has no incentive 
to voluntarily pay for a service where the exclusion for non-payment is not assured 
(Stiglitz, 2000).  
 Public recreation areas are difficult to put into particular categories of public 
goods.  Pristine wilderness areas with minimal human impact could be considered “pure” 
public goods – non-rival and non-excludable in consumption.  In contrast, public 
recreation areas have the potential to become rivalrous with congestion, where an 
individual’s use impacts the use of another person.  User fees have often been 
implemented in these instances to reduce congestion, exclude, and account for 
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externalities such as ecological damage.  However, these efficiency gains could be 
potentially moderated with high administrative costs associated with exclusion (Weimer 
and Vining, 2005), such as providing staff for all entrances to parks to collect fees or 
developing a complicated, labor-intensive fee system.  Transaction cost remains a 
challenge in setting up an efficient user fee pricing system (Weimer and Vining, 2005; 
Duff, 2004).   
 
User Fees in Parks and Recreation 
 Considering the need to exclude participants in rivalrous, congested recreation 
areas and the need to raise revenue, pricing systems in parks and recreation must 
reconcile two potentially conflicting objectives:  generating revenue and maintaining 
access (Kyle, Graefe, and Absher, 2002).  The ability of user fees to generate revenue in 
parks and recreation systems is generally accepted (More, 1999).  Due to increased self-
generated revenue, most of which came from user fees, local parks and recreation 
budgets in North Carolina from 1986-2001 remained steady despite reductions from 
appropriations (Gladwell, Anderson and Sellers, 2003).  Other concerns, related to 
maintaining access are also prevalent in the literature: efficiency (Rosenthal, Loomis, and 
Peterson, 1984; More, 1999), fairness and equity, user ability to pay, and congestion 
(Richer and Christensen, 1999). 
 Rosenthal, Loomis, and Peterson’s (1984) work, “Pricing for Efficiency and 
Revenue in Public Recreation Areas” provides much of the economic basis for user fees 
in parks and recreation.  The authors assert that rationing by price is the best way to 
achieve efficiency in parks and recreation.  Equity, community stability, and 
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environmental quality are also assured by pricing.  User fees help recreation areas 
become more self-sufficient and deter ecological damage by limiting congestion.  
Rosenthal, Loomis, and Peterson (1984) suggest that prices charged for public recreation 
activities are generally low and are not being effectively utilized in regulating use and 
demonstrating demand and user preferences.  For pricing to be appropriate, marginal cost 
should be above zero; in public recreation, costs include congestion, ecological damage, 
and operating costs.  Under congestion, the use of one individual affects the use of 
another.  At this point, the good becomes rival in consumption and an appropriate price 
would be set at the utility lost by the other user.  Similarly, the marginal cost of 
ecological damage is equal to the amount of damage done by the user.  An efficient 
pricing system could limit congestion by making the user realize the full cost of the 
service including operating costs and ecological damage (Richer and Christensen, 1999; 
More, 1999). 
 Most opponents of user fees in parks and recreation realize the potential 
efficiency gains of pricing systems (More, 1999; Richer and Christensen, 1999).  
However, critics contend that inappropriately designed fees can harm efficiency.  
Opponents have labeled user fees as “double taxation” (Richer and Christensen, 1999; 
Winter, Palucki, and Burkhardt, 1999).  To the extent that programs receive revenues 
from general taxation and user fees, these criticisms are accurate.  Additionally, poorly 
designed user fees, either excessive or for non-rivalrous goods, could result in 
underconsumption and expected revenue will not be generated.   
 The fairness and equity considerations in parks and recreation funding deal with 
connecting beneficiaries directly to the cost of service and maintenance of access.  User 
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fees insure that those interested in the service, and willing to pay, are allowed to 
participate while non-users are excluded (Rosenthal, Loomis, and Peterson, 1984). They 
effectively transfer the cost of the service to those who use it most (More, 1999).  As a 
result, users are no longer being subsidized by non-users through the general taxation 
mechanism. 
 Regarding equity and fairness, opponents are primarily concerned with how user 
fees can impact the participation of low-income users.  Since user fees are related to 
consumption of a good, the fees are regressive and impose a higher burden on low-
income individuals, because they spend a higher percentage of their income on 
consumption (Duff, 2004).  Several studies have suggested that user fees cause 
participation to decrease, especially with low-income users (More, 1999; Samnaliev, 
More, and Stevens, 2006; More and Stevens, 2000). In a mail survey of New Hampshire 
and Vermont households, user fees were widely accepted, but participation for those 
earning less than $30,000 per year substantially decreased.  Twenty-three percent of low-
income respondents said they reduced participation after recent fee increases, while only 
eleven percent of high-income respondents indicated a reduction in their participation 
(More and Stevens, 2000, 341). 
Public Response to User Fees 
 The public response to user fees has varied.  The process of implementing user 
fees has been shown to be as important as the fee.  Anderson and Friedmund (2004) 
conducted in-depth interviews of active opponents of the Recreation Fee Demonstration 
Program (RFDP), authorized by Congress in 1996 to allow federal land agencies to set 
user fees on federal lands.  The participants’ opposition to RFDP was based on three 
9 
 
main factors: belief about the role of public lands, perception that the political process 
was secretive and exclusionary, and concern about the management of the program.  The 
study provided support for the importance of the process of setting up user fees as well as 
the outcome.  Similarly, Fix and Vaske (2007) found that participants’ beliefs about the 
fee structure were the strongest predictor of the evaluation of the fees.  Organizational 
trust and adequate information on the user fees have been shown to be major 
determinants on the acceptance of user fees (Nyaupane, 2009; Winter, Palucki, and 
Burkhardt, 1999).   
 Among alternative funding options, user fees have received mixed reviews.  From 
a national sample of 12,000 households, respondents were asked questions about how ten 
different recreation activities should be funded.  Ninety five percent responded that user 
fees or a combination of taxes and user fees should fund at least one recreation activity.  
More support was shown for activities often offered in both public and private sectors, 
such as campgrounds and boat ramps.  Only one-third of participants selected “taxes-
only” funding, suggesting that the public does not think users should bear the full cost of 
the activity (Bowker, Cordell, and Johnson, 1999).  One study showed a favorable 
evaluation of the general entrance fee, approximately three-quarters of the participants 
described the fee as “about right” (Fix and Vaske, 2007).  A survey of wilderness area 
users showed support for user fees in developed areas, but minimal support was given for 
user fees in wilderness areas (Williams, Vogt, and Vitterso, 1999).  In More and Stevens’ 
(2000, 352) study, broad support was given for user fees; forty percent of the respondents 
preferred user fees to other forms of funding.   
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However, in Mowen, Kyle, Borrie and Graefe’s (2006) research, participants were 
most supportive of corporate sponsorships and private donations as alternative revenue 
sources.  Park services privatization and the use of park entrance fees received the least 
support.  In a 2002 mail survey of New Hampshire and Idaho households, donation 
boxes, corporate sponsorships, and adopt-a-site contracts were strongly supported as 
alternative funding mechanisms.  Increased taxes and user fees were not supported by the 
participants.  Additionally, twenty-five percent of the respondents indicated that user fees 
negatively impacted their use of public recreation (Samnaliev, Stevens, and More, 2006, 
35).  Providing evidence for user fee opponents, a survey of New Hampshire and 
Vermont households cited a substantial reduction in recreation participation for low-
income users after user fees were introduced (More and Stevens, 2000).  
  
Montana State Parks User Fees 
The first user fee in a Montana state park was instituted in 1939 for tours at Lewis 
and Clark Caverns.  Tour admission was $0.75 for adults and $0.25 for children 
(Legislative Audit Division, 2001, 8).  Since that time, user fees have remained a major, 
growing funding source for Montana State Parks.  User fees in Montana have included 
daily entrance or annual “passport” fees, camping fees, cave tour fees, boat ramp use fees 
and group use fees (Montana State Parks, 1998).  In times of financial difficulty, user fees 
have typically increased to raise additional revenue.  From 1969, when the first camping 
fee was charged, to 1998, the fee was raised nine times (Montana State Parks, 1998, 17-
27).  Strategic funding plans were developed from the late 1980s to 2002, and all plans 
advocated for an increase in existing user fees and the establishment of new fees to help 
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fund parks (The State Park Futures Committee, 1990; Montana State Parks, 1998; State 
Parks Futures Committee II, 2002).   
In “2020 Vision for Montana State Parks,” a long-term strategic plan for the 
Montana State Parks system, the Montana State Parks department articulated the 
efficiency and equity concerns associated with user fees: 
 
One of the main arguments for the new emphasis on user fees is that users have 
not been paying their share, while the general public has been paying for too great 
a proportion… An opposing argument is that the public goods provided by 
resource management agencies should be broadly subsidized—in the same 
manner that schools and libraries are—because what is provided is of general 
benefit to society as a whole, even non-users. Some people feel they should not 
have to pay to use public outdoor resources. Another aspect of this argument is 
the need to find ways to make these public goods and services affordable to less 
well-off members of society… Both of these perspectives have merit, and they are 
not mutually exclusive. It seems evident from trends occurring around the country 
and in Montana, however, that there is likely to be continued pressure to increase 
and expand user fees throughout government for a wide variety of public goods, 
including those related to outdoor recreation (Montana State Parks, 1998, 257). 
 
Embracing the utilization of user fees while understanding the associated challenges, the 
department sought to increase the yield of user fees, moving the user fee funding 
percentage from 21 percent to a range between 30 and 50 percent.  Managers believed 
that park visitors would be willing to pay more, citing a Department of Fish, Wildlife, 
and Parks study showing that 75 percent of State Park Passport holders are getting either 
a “good” or “very good” value from their passport (Montana State Parks, 1998, 257).  
The report proposed a regular review of fees to determine possible increases.  
Considering equity concerns associated with access, discounts to low-income visitors 
were proposed.  The expansion of user fees in other areas, outreach to commercial 
interests such as outdoor outfitters and concessions, better enforcement of fee non-
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compliance and periodic free entrance days were all proposed as ways to increase 
visitation and user-fee revenue generation (Montana State Parks, 1998).  
The Montana “Opt-out” Fee 
 In 2003, the State of Montana pioneered a new approach to generate revenue for 
state parks.  The legislature enacted a $4 “opt-out” fee to be paid during vehicle 
registration.  In the Montana opt-out fee provision, individuals are charged the fee unless 
they sign additional paperwork to opt-out of payment.  The fee was established to 
generate enough revenue to replace state appropriations and park entry fees during a time 
when financial support from the state was dwindling (Legislative Fiscal Division, 2009).  
Proponents have argued that the move will “free Montana’s state parks” (McKee, 2003) 
by replacing the annual passport and day use system.  Advocates projected that the 
revenue generated from the new fee would replace both state appropriations and park 
entry fees and increase visitation.  Opponents have described the move as hidden taxation 
(Gevock, 2004).  Several states have moved to implement similar measures.  Washington 
State has enacted a “donation” program during vehicle registration.  During registration, 
individuals are automatically signed up for a $5 “donation” unless they fill out paperwork 
to opt-out of the gift (Washington State Parks and Recreation Commission, 2009).  
Arizona, Michigan, and California have also attempted to implement vehicle registration 
fees for state park funding with varying levels of success.    
Methodology 
A case study approach is used to examine the Montana opt-out fee in order to 
draw conclusions on the effectiveness of the strategy for generating revenue and 
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increasing efficiency and equity.  The case study consists of a relevant history of the 
Montana opt-out fee including the origins of the fee, its legislative history, and budgetary 
implications.  Criteria from Mikesell (2007) including efficiency, equity, collection 
cost/simplicity, and revenue consequences are utilized to evaluate the opt-out fee as a 
viable revenue option.  Data on the background of the Montana opt-out fee are collected 
from Montana State sources including the Department of Revenue, the Montana State 
Legislature, and the Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks.  Qualitative analysis is aided 
by the relevant literature on public finance, budgeting, and economics. 
Operational definitions 
For the purposes of this study, criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of the 
Montana opt-out fee is defined based on the current literature regarding user fees in parks 
and recreation.  Efficiency is gauged by the extent the fee gives agency managers 
information on demand and client preference and how it mitigates negative externalities 
such as ecological damage by limiting congestion.  Equity is advanced if a larger portion 
of the cost is shifted to the highest users of the system and low-income users are not 
dramatically impacted by the fee.  Collection cost refers to the transaction costs 
associated with setting up a pricing system and can be analyzed quantitatively.  
Simplicity is more difficult to determine, but accounts from users on the complexity of 
the system will provide some evidence.  Revenue consequences can be determined 
through data from the Montana Department of Revenue.   
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Analysis of the Montana State Parks Opt-Out Fee 
The Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks (DFWP) manages the state 
parks system.  DFWP is comprised of eight divisions with different functions in 
managing Montana’s fish, wildlife and recreation resources.  The Parks Division, also 
known as Montana State Parks, is tasked with “providing diverse recreational 
opportunities while preserving the historical, archaeological, scientific, and cultural 
resources of the state” (Legislative Fiscal Division, 2008, 3). 
Origins 
The creation of the Montana State Parks system can be traced to 1929 when the 
Montana Land Board was authorized by the legislature to set aside land for state parks.  
The first state park was not established until 1939 after the National Park Service donated 
Lewis and Clark Caverns (Legislative Audit Division, 2001).  The 1939 legislature 
established a State Parks Commission and set the foundation for the Montana State Parks 
system.  The system was designed to: 
[conserve] the scenic, historic, archaeological, scientific and recreational 
resources of the state and [provide] for their use and enjoyment, thereby 
contributing to the cultural, recreational, and economic life of the people and their 
health (The State Park Futures Committee, 1990, 5).  
  
 
Inadequate funding, staffing, and management resources have been a challenge to 
fulfilling state parks responsibilities since the establishment of the system.  Despite the 
expansion of state parks in the 1960s and 1970s in response to the increasing consumer 
demand, funding remained relatively flat due to inflation.  The economic downturn in the 
1980s agitated the funding situation.  The State of Montana’s budget crisis resulted in a 
reduction of approximately $1,000,000 annually in the state parks’ budget from the 
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elimination of General Fund support, a reduction of appropriations from the coal tax, and 
a cut from the Federal Land and Water Conservation Fund.  Such a large reduction in 
funding caused a cutback in operations and maintenance.  A moratorium on new capital 
projects and the acquisition of new park lands was also instituted.   To raise additional 
revenue, statewide entrance and other user fees were first established in 1989.  The 1989 
legislature appropriated $2.6 million to address deferred maintenance costs and aid in the 
transition to a user fee-based system.  Despite these interventions to inject more revenue 
into the state park system in the late 1980s, Montana was near the bottom among all fifty 
states in funding.  Montana spent $25,000 annually per park while Colorado spent 
$145,000, and North Dakota spent $66,000.  As a result, maintenance continued to be a 
problem and the full economic potential of the state park system was not realized (The 
State Park Futures Committee, 1990, 17). 
The State Park Futures Committee 
In response to these challenges, the State Park Futures Committee was established 
to make recommendations to Governor Stan Stephens, the 52nd Montana State Legislature 
and the Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks on the proper role, priorities and funding 
structure for state parks.  From August of 1989 to November of 1990, the Committee 
conducted interviews with industry professionals, held public meetings, collected surveys 
from the Montana residents, and examined the operations of state parks.  The Committee 
identified five areas that contributed to the problems of the state parks system: role of 
state parks, long-range planning, management, image and marketing, and funding.  
Regarding the roles of state parks, the Committee contended that the broad mandate 
established by the legislature in 1939 caused confusion about the proper role of the state 
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parks system.  Long-range planning had also been stagnant due to low funding and 
staffing.  As a result, the public did not have adequate information about the state parks 
program.  The management challenges of housing the parks department in the 
Department of Fish and Wildlife were also identified.  The different needs in managing 
non-renewable cultural and environmental resources of the parks compared to renewable 
wildlife resources were raised.  Additionally, the public image of the state park system 
was very poor (The State Park Futures Committee, 1990).   
Lastly, inadequate funding and lack of support from the General Fund were 
identified as major constraints in meeting the needs of the state parks system.  Without 
additional funding, the Committee asserted that conditions at park facilities including 
roads, water and septic systems, and boat ramps would continue to deteriorate.  The 
conservation function of the parks system would not be met and environmental 
conditions would worsen.  Staff positions would have to be eliminated and educational 
opportunities for visitors would be drastically cut.  The Department of Fish, Wildlife and 
Parks presented the Committee with four funding scenarios that would support Montana 
State Parks at different levels: current funding, park protection, park improvement, and 
accelerated park improvement.  The Committee recommended several new funding 
sources to meet the accelerated park improvement scenario to account for moderate 
growth and improvement, and to secure the state parks system for up to five years.  Ten 
criteria, outlined in Table 1, were identified to evaluate the new funding sources.   
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Table 1: Prioritized Criteria for Evaluating Funding Options 
 
1. Preferred new funding sources should not create obligations or earmarking which diverts the 
department from, or is in conflict with, the park mission. 
 
2. Recommended new funding sources should not carry accounting responsibilities and complexities 
which are beyond the management scope and capacity of department, but should contribute to a 
planned and balanced parks program. 
 
3. The recommended funding options should have broad constituency support. 
 
4. Funding sources which can be expected to provide long-term benefits, are stable and predictable, 
are preferred. 
 
5. Funding sources which are the least costly and simplest to manage and which provide a revenue 
source large enough to assure a high "benefits to the public" vs. "cost to administer" ratio are 
preferred. 
 
6. Funding sources which can be shown to have a logical tie to the purpose for which they will be 
spent are preferred. 
 
7. Activity-related user fees should provide benefits to those who paid the fees. 
 
8. Funding which permits or instills an expression of pride and confidence in the parks system and 
which can be used to enhance the aesthetic value of the system is preferred. 
 
9. Given the demands on traditional funding sources, the Committee will also give priority 
consideration to new, innovative, and creative funding options. 
 
10. Because the public recognizes that there are urgent needs in parks and is rightly impatient to have 
them addressed, funding sources which will provide immediate budget relief to provide quick and 
visible improvements are also needed. 
 
Source:  The State Park Futures Committee, 1990, 36 
 
 
Significant funding resources were needed to meet the goals of accelerated park 
improvement – about $6,313,000 annually.  Sixteen new funding sources were identified 
and recommended by the Committee (as outlined in Table 2).  The proposed revenue 
sources included increased user fees at state parks as well as for unrelated services.  The 
reintroduction of General Fund support was requested coupled with an increase of 
statewide taxes and establishment of new taxes. 
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Table 2: Recommended Funding Sources 
 
• Rental Car Fees 
• General Fund, restore 
• Coal Tax, increase Parks’ share 
• Statewide Mil Levy 
• New $0.01 Gas Tax 
• Big Sky Dividend 
• Sales Tax 
• Recreational Equipment Tax 
• User Fees 
• Restaurant Tax 
• RV Sticker 
• Nonresident Boat Fees 
• Existing Park Roads Maintenance Law Amendment 
• Motor Vehicle Taxes 
• Small Boat Fees 
• Federal Matching Funds 
 
Source:  The State Park Futures Committee, 1990, 36 
 
 
The motor vehicle tax recommendation is most closely related to Montana’s opt-out fee.  
As most visitors arrive by vehicle, and much of the maintenance costs at parks are 
associated with vehicle traffic, the Committee reasoned that a vehicle tax would be 
appropriate.  At the time of the report, there were approximately one million vehicles 
registered in Montana; the recommended $0.50 fee could potentially raise $500,000 
annually (The State Park Futures Committee, 1990, 42). 
As a result of the State Park Futures Committee’s recommendations, the 
Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks adopted a statewide entrance fee system.  The 
number of state parks shrank from 60 to 42 so that the agency could focus on core 
properties. Significant improvement was made on deferred maintenance.  Although the 
recommended funding levels were not adopted, the General Fund revenue was returned 
to the parks system, and there were efforts to increase funding for capital improvement, 
historical preservation, maintenance, and staffing.  A new program provided volunteers 
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from the Montana University system; and by 1994, these volunteers performed work 
equivalent to ten full-time employees, thus saving the system $115,000 annually. New 
Visitors Centers were added to select, high-impact parks.  The smaller, better funded 
system began attracting more visitors in the mid 1990s and helped in improving the local 
and regional economies (Montana State Parks, 1998, 26).  
2020 Vision for Montana State Parks 
In 1995, Montana State Parks began “2020 Vision for Montana State Parks,” a 
long-term strategic plan for ensuring the success of state parks in the first two decades of 
the twenty-first century.  Holding with the analysis of the State Park Futures Committee, 
the department identified the establishment of adequate and stable long-term funding as a 
major goal.  The project highlighted the importance of a diverse funding regiment to 
“ride out tough political and economic times” (Montana State Parks, 1998, 253).  The 
department recommended several alternative funding sources to build a more diverse and 
versatile revenue system.  An expansion of the gift item program where visitors could 
buy Montana State Parks merchandise was recommended.  Increased outreach to 
charitable foundations and the legislature was suggested.  As suggested by the State Park 
Futures Committee, a rental car surcharge was also highlighted.  The project also 
prescribed options described as less politically feasible, such as increasing General Fund 
support, coal tax and fuel tax allocations, and user fees (Montana State Parks, 1998). 
State Parks Futures Committee II 
In 2001, the Montana State Legislative Audit Division conducted a performance 
audit of the Montana State Parks program.  While positive reforms had taken place as a 
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result of the State Parks Futures Committee recommendations, the audit identified needed 
improvements as a result of changes to the system in the years since the Committee 
submitted its report.  The Committee had promoted the equal distribution of user-fees 
across the system to promote equity and raise revenue, but revenues from user fees 
remained flat from 1990 to 2000 due to the Primitive Parks Act, established in 1993, 
which exempted one-third of the state parks from entrance fees.  Additionally, the 
resources for monitoring fee compliance were not developed as recommended by the  
Committee to increase the collection of user fees.  Due to the increase in visitation and 
the changes over the twelve years since the previous review of parks in State Park 
Futures Committee’s report, the Legislative auditors suggested that a new review of state 
parks was needed (Legislative Audit Division, 2001). 
The State Parks Futures Committee II was established through an Executive 
Order by Governor Judy Martz in October 2001.  The purpose of the State Parks Futures 
Committee II was to make recommendations to Governor Marks, the Department of Fish, 
Wildlife and Parks, and the legislature regarding changes in parks and new challenges 
that occurred since the first State Parks Futures Committee report. On the issue of 
funding, the Committee was charged with developing recommendations for addressing 
flat revenues and rising costs.  Although the Committee members did not seek unanimous 
consent on funding recommendations, they voted on each recommendation and the 
percentage level of support was offered.  Table 3 details the funding recommendations 
and levels of support. 
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Table 3: State Parks Futures II Major Funding Recommendations 
  
Item Level of 
Support 
Current 
Price 
Proposed 
Price 
Estimated New 
Revenue 
Park Passport 78% $24/15 $30/20 $30,000 
Caverns Tour 89% $8/5 $10/5 $35,000 
Prime Camping 78% $12/8 $15/11 $20,000 
Eliminate Senior Discount 89% ½ price 
camping 
Full price 
camping 
$15,000 
Motorboat decal 56% $2.50 $10 $231,000 
RV license fee 67% $3.50 $5 $90,961 
Boat in Lieu 67% 20% of 
fees 
25% of fees $68,750 
Non-motorized boat fee* 44% $0 $5-$10 $354,000 - 
$700,000 
Vehicle license plate fee* 56% $0 $4/vehicle $2,900,000 
Statewide Mill Levy* 44% $0 - $2,200,000 
 
*New funding sources 
Source: State Parks Futures Committee II, 2002, 15-16 
 
 
Moreover, the Committee recommended the abolishment of park entrance fees if 
the vehicle license plate fee or statewide mill levy was adopted.   The Committee 
estimated that if the license plate fee became a mandatory charge on approximately 
900,000 light vehicles on Montana’s roads, it would generate about $2.9 million 
annually, after accounting for lost entrance fee revenue and administrative costs.  Also, a 
statewide mill levy would potentially generate about $2.2 million annually.  The potential 
for revenue generation through a license plate fee or statewide mill levy was apparent.  
However, the Committee was concerned with the potential administrative costs 
associated with the license plate fee and preferred the mill levy option.  Additionally, the 
Committee believed that the license plate fee may be more regressive and could 
potentially harm low-income users (State Parks Futures Committee II, 2002, 11-12).  
Despite the Committee’s preference for the mill levy option, the legislature chose to 
consider the vehicle license plate fee – which eventually became the Montana opt-out fee. 
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 Senate Bill 336 
Effective January 1, 2004, the Senate Bill 336 established an optional $4 fee for 
light passenger vehicles to provide funding for state parks.  The bill was designed to: 
… [implement] recommendations of the State Parks Futures II Committee to 
improve the operation and funding of the state park system; assessing an optional 
$4 fee for each passenger car or truck under 8001 pounds… that is registered for 
licensing and directing that the fee be used for state parks [and] fishing access 
sites; allowing the registrant… to make a written election not to pay the additional 
$4 fee if the registrant does not intend to use state parks... providing that persons 
who pay the optional fee may not be required to pay a day-use fee for access to 
state parks… (Montana State Legislature, 2003, 1) 
 
The legislation set aside $3.50 of the fee for state parks funding, $0.25 for fishing access 
weed maintenance, and $0.25 for the operation of the state-owned facilities at Virginia 
City and Nevada City.  The passage of the fee eliminated day-use entrance fees for 
residents.  Additionally, Montana State Parks would no longer be subsidized through 
regular appropriations from the General Fund (Montana State Legislature, 2003).  
The Senate Bill 336 passed through the Senate without amendments.  The bill 
called for a $4 opt-out fee for parks funding.  However, the House of Representatives 
amended the bill to include an opt-in fee.  In the conference committee, the Senate 
rejected the opt-in fee provision, since the Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks 
(DFWP) was skeptical that the fee would raise the necessary revenue.  The Department 
saw the opt-out fee as a relatively simple, optional method for generating funds for state 
parks and did not intend to enforce non-payment (Montana State Legislature, 2004). 
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Implementation of the Opt-out Fee 
 
The opt-out fee replaced day-use and passport entrance fees.  Following the 
implementation of the fee, the only certification needed to enter a state park without 
paying an entrance fee was a Montana State license plate.  Park users from other states 
were able to purchase day-use passes or annual passports.  Agency managers expected 
that about 50 percent of the individuals registering vehicles would opt-out of payment of 
the fee.  During vehicle registration, individuals who do not use state parks facilities can 
sign a waiver stating that they do not intend to use state parks.  However, the policy of 
DFWP is to allow any vehicle with a Montana license plate to access state parks for free.  
Due to the infeasibility of monitoring non-payment of the fee, DFWP adopted a policy 
that relied on citizens’ honesty for compliance with the new law (Montana State 
Legislature, 2004).  Senator Mahlum, the sponsor of Senate Bill 336, echoed the notion 
of trust with the new law: 
The idea of this bill is TRUST.  If you are a Montana citizen and have elected to 
pay the [$4] parks fee, you are entitled to all of the Parks place to visit… For 
those people who choose not to buy the [$4] license and choose to go to the Parks 
in Montana, there is nothing we can do.  Hopefully, as this is a matter of trust, 
only a few percent of people will choose to do this… I am still convinced this will 
be good for the people of Montana as so many people do use the parks/fishing 
access that our state has to offer (Montana Legislature, 2004). 
 
The Montana opt-out fee was met with both enthusiasm and resistance.  Despite 
the transfer of a large part of the burden to an opt-out user fee, advocates identified the 
change as a move to “free Montana’s state parks” (McKee, 2003).  The fee was perceived 
as making entry into state parks free regardless of the fact that payment was being made 
by individuals in a different way.  Opponents viewed the new fee as a hidden tax.  “Opt-
out is a device by which people are tricked out of money or rights” (Gibson, 2004, 1).  
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The initial implementation of the opt-out fee worked to confirm opponents’ fears when 
the Department of Justice left the $4 fee out of vehicle renewals for the first month.  
When the Department sent out renewal cards pointing out the error, the cards did not say 
the fee was optional.  Eventually, the error was corrected and the optional nature of the 
fee was publicized (Gevock, 2004).  
Budgetary Implications 
The opt-out fee provides significant support for the Montana State Parks budget.  
The Montana State Parks system is funded by four primary sources: bed tax, coal tax, 
state parks miscellaneous fund, and motorboat fuel tax.  A 6.5 percent bed tax provides 
funds for the maintenance of state parks facilities.  A coal severance tax of 1.27 percent is 
set aside for parks acquisition and management.  State Parks Miscellaneous is a special 
state revenue fund where revenues raised through user fees, concessions and the opt-out 
fee are deposited.  The Montana State Parks system receives 9/10 of the 1 percent 
motorboat fuel tax for the improvement of state parks where motor boating is allowed 
(Legislative Fiscal Division, 2009).  Table 4 provides the revenue history of Montana 
State Parks from 2000 to 2009 with revenue projections for 2010 and 2011. 
Table 4: Parks Program Major Revenue Sources 
 
Source 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010* 2011* 
Bed Tax $683,423 $682,624 $733,850 $769,199 $865,807 $887,350 $910,440 $1,160,434 $1,117,667 $1,074,826 $1,175,000 $1,225,000 
Coal Tax $1,103,431 $1,059,393 $1,129,826 $1,129,100 $1,039,904 $1,044,208 $888,754 $990,758 $1,168,343 $1,003,879 $1,079,000 $1,112,000 
State Parks Misc. $1,652,204 $1,664,708 $1,496,221 $1,744,096 $3,217,544 $4,800,554 $4,339,958 $4,601,078 $4,325,769 $4,394,632 $4,415,609 $4,415,609 
Motorboat Fuel $1,293,927 $1,158,095 $1,174,389 $1,170,010 $1,203,408 $1,122,338 $1,190,844 $1,210,284 $1,137,441 $1,085,547 $1,086,000 $1,080,000 
 Total $4,732,985 $4,564,820 $4,534,286 $4,812,405 $6,326,663 $7,854,450 $7,329,996 $7,962,554 $7,749,220 $7,558,884 $7,755,609 $7,832,609 
 
*Projected Revenue 
Source: Legislative Fiscal Division, 2009, 3 
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The opt-out fee is the largest contributor to the State Parks Miscellaneous Fund.  
However, revenues from the opt-out fee have remained flat since fiscal year 2005 (see 
Table 5). 
 
 
Table 5: State Parks Miscellaneous Revenue 
 
Source 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Lt Vehicle Registration $0 $0 $0 $0 $1,339,791 $3,401,832 $2,947,055 $2,835,665 $2,859,106 $2,745,194 
Camping/Cabin Rentals $285,083 $261,668 $252,446 $293,967 $438,315 $425,341 $442,816 $425,468 $444,141 $532,229 
Passports $197,280 $202,299 $250,060 $240,034 $58,470 $13,740 $15,030 $15,885 $18,893 $24,010 
Guided Tours $303,140 $301,107 $246,323 $264,879 $388,835 $392,000 $387,609 $395,917 $436,864 $390,890 
Day Use Fees $403,215 $381,684 $342,107 $393,065 $323,919 $95,263 $86,729 $81,691 $83,485 $96,788 
 Subtotal $1,188,718 $1,146,758 $1,090,936 $1,191,945 $2,549,330 $4,328,176 $3,879,239 $3,754,626 $3,842,489 $3,789,111 
 
Source: Legislative Fiscal Division, 2009, 3 
 
 
While eliminating regular General Fund support and lowering entrance fee revenue, the 
opt-out fee has generated significant revenue for the Parks Division, causing a 31.47 
percent jump in revenue from fiscal years 2003 to 2004.  Still, Montana State Parks 
continues to face fiscal challenges as demand and basic costs like gas, electricity and 
nominal salary adjustments increase and the productivity of revenue streams remain 
relatively flat (Legislative Fiscal Division, 2009). 
Analysis 
While extensive research has been conducted on the merits and challenges of user 
fees in public recreation, little inquiry has occurred on opt-out fees.  To gain a better 
understanding of the opt-out fee, an evaluation utilizing concepts from public financing, 
budgeting, and economics in a public recreation context is necessary.  Mikesell (2007) 
suggests that efficiency, equity, collection cost/simplicity, and revenue consequences 
should be considered in evaluating revenue options.  Considering the relevant public 
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recreation literature, efficiency is evaluated in this analysis by the extent to which the 
opt-out fee gives agency managers information on client demand and preference and 
mitigates negative externalities such as ecological damage by limiting congestion.  Equity 
is advanced if a larger portion of the cost is shifted to the highest users of the system and 
low-income users are not dramatically impacted by the fee.  Collection cost/simplicity is 
determined by the administrative costs and complexity of the opt-out fee system.  The 
revenue consequences can be examined by evaluating the budgetary effects of the new 
fee to determine if appropriate revenue was raised.  Table 6 details the analysis. 
 
Table 6: Opt-Out Fee Analysis Using Mikesell (2007) and Public Recreation 
Financing Operational Criteria 
 
Mikesell (2007) Criteria Operational Criteria Criteria Met? 
Efficiency Information on Demand and Client Preference No 
 Reduces Congestion and Corrects Negative Externalities No 
   
Equity Cost Shifted to Higher Users No 
 Minimal Low-income User Impact Mixed 
   
Cost Collection and 
Simplicity 
Low Administrative Costs and Simplicity of System Yes 
   
Revenue Consequences Adequate Revenue Raised and Minimal Negative 
Budget Implications 
Yes 
 
Efficiency  
Based on the operational criteria of the study, the Montana opt-out fee is a 
structurally inefficient funding mechanism.  Data on demand are limited due to the lack 
of entrance fees.  The utilization of park resources by non-payers is not monitored.  As a 
result, congestion and overconsumption are likely. 
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Information on Demand and Client Preferences 
User fees have the potential to connect agencies with public demand by providing 
a record of usage and preferences (Mikesell, 2007; Duff, 2004).  Prior to the opt-out fee, 
Montana had a system of entrance fees that could provide information on attendance at 
particular parks.  Managers could use that information to gauge public interest and 
determine where to allocate scarce resources.  When the opt-out fee system eliminated 
the resident day-use and annual passport entrance fees, managers were left with less 
information on demand and client preferences. 
 
Congestion and Negative Externalities 
User fees offer the opportunity to connect individuals directly to the cost of 
production of a good.  Under general taxation, benefits are partially subsidized by non-
users, and an individual does not fully realize the cost of the benefit.  As a result, over-
consumption of the benefit and the free-rider problem may occur.  In terms of remedy, 
user fees can be set at the marginal cost of production and can take into account negative 
externalities such as ecological damage (Weimer and Vining, 2005; Duff, 2004).  A park 
manager could choose to raise the entrance fee for a particular park if congestion was 
causing the quality of the park experience to deteriorate either through overcrowding or 
environmental damage.  At the local level, the manager could even set the price to 
account for specific negative externalities. 
The opt-out fee does not perform this efficiency function.  Instead, it has the 
potential to increase congestion and does not offer managers the tools to set appropriate 
pricing at the local level.  By lacking an exclusion mechanism and eliminating entrance 
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fees, the opt-out fee has switched the state parks from an excludable to a non-excludable 
public good.  Individuals have little incentive to pay the opt-out fee since compliance is 
not monitored if non-payers attempt to enter state parks.  Doug Monger, the Parks 
Division Administrator at the time of the introduction of the opt-out fee, believed that 
attendance would drastically increase.  In his words, “currently, we serve about 1.6 
million people per year… when state parks are free, we’re guessing that will double” 
(McKee, 2003).  A large increase in attendance without exclusionary controls could result 
in congestion, turning what many consider a “pure” public good into a rivalrous, non-
excludable good prone to overconsumption.  
Equity 
The opt-out fee partially advances equity.  The system is designed in a way that 
low-income individuals can easily be free-riders and gain the benefits without paying the 
fee.  However, regarding shifting the cost to high users, the fee acts more like a general 
tax and is relatively disconnected from the benefit.   
 
Cost Shifted to High Users 
User fees have great potential to promote equity because users pay most of the 
cost of the good (Stiglitz, 2000; Duff, 2004; Mikesell, 2007).  Whereas the general 
taxation subsidizes the benefits of users with the resources of non-users, user fees place 
the cost burden on those who benefit the most.  User fees also offer “close-
complementarity” where there is a direct link between payment of a fee and the receipt of 
a government service (Mikesell, 2007).  Under the day-use and passport system, payment 
of the user fee was made by those benefiting from the public good.  The payment was 
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directly linked to the benefit and the cost was mostly borne by the beneficiary.  The opt-
out fee, instead, performs a quasi-tax function where the majority of car owners 
subsidizes the benefits of park users.  Equity is harmed as cost is shifted away from the 
direct users and moved to the general population.  While the utilization of vehicle taxes 
for state park funding was originally justified due to high maintenance costs of vehicle 
use on state parks roads, the link between the payment of the opt-out fee and the receipt 
of the benefit is weak (The State Park Futures Committee, 1990).  
 
Minimal Low-Income User Impact 
Equity concerns with the cost burden of user fees on low-income users should 
also be considered.  Significant literature exists on the regressive nature of user fees 
(Duff, 2004) and the resulting participation reduction with high user fees ((More, 1999; 
Samnaliev, More, and Stevens, 2006; More and Stevens, 2000).  The Department of Fish, 
Wildlife, and Parks (DFWP) considered user fee discounts for low-income participants 
but never implemented them (The State Park Futures Committee, 1990).  Additionally, 
the State Park Futures II Committee (2002) described the license plate fee as more 
regressive than the proposed mill levy and cautioned that it could disproportionately 
impact low-income users negatively.  However, the removal of entrance fees may 
actually reduce cost for low-income individuals.  Previously, entrance into state parks 
required a standard payment, but under the opt-out fee, individuals can easily opt out of 
payment and continue to use the service as “free-riders.” 
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Collection Cost and Simplicity 
Gains in efficiency and equity can be compromised by high administrative costs 
associated with complex systems (Weimer and Vining, 2005; Duff, 2004).  The opt-out 
fee system is relatively inexpensive to administer and works to simplify certain 
components of state parks funding by working through existing fee mechanisms. 
The opt-out fee uses an existing system, the vehicle registration process, to collect 
the revenue. The Department of Fish, Wildlife, and Parks (DFWP) developed the process 
with the Department of Justice, Motor Vehicles Division.  While an “opt-in” fee would 
have been easier to administer, DFWP determined that adequate funding will not be 
generated through an opt-in fee (Montana State Legislature, 2004).  Instead, fee waivers 
were developed and processed by DFWP for those individuals who opted out of payment.  
Administrative costs were low due to the lack of effort in enforcing noncompliance with 
the fee.  Additionally, the opt-out fee eliminated entrance fees and solved the perennial 
problem of monitoring non-compliance with user-fee payment (The State Park Futures 
Committee, 1990; Montana State Parks, 1998).   
 
Revenue Consequences 
The opt-out fee replaced entrance fee revenue for Montana citizens and regular 
General Fund appropriations.  Between fiscal years 2003 and 2004, the Parks Division 
saw a budget increase of 31.47 percent due to the opt-out fee.  However, since 2005, opt-
out fee revenues have remained flat.  During that same time, expenditures have risen.  
Although the opt-out fee has raised significant revenue, the Parks Division is still in need 
of additional funding. 
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The revenue generating potential of a vehicle registration fee is obvious.  Of the 
funding options proposed in the State Parks Futures II report, the vehicle license fee had 
the highest revenue potential (State Parks Futures II Committee, 2002).  As a quasi-tax 
structure, a small increase shared by a larger population has the potential of raising 
significant additional revenue if necessary. 
 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
The Montana opt-out fee during vehicle registration is an innovative funding 
strategy with great potential of generating revenue for state parks.  The Montana opt-out 
fee has certainly performed a revenue generation function for the Montana State Parks 
system.  The removal of General Fund support, subject to political and other 
environmental factors, has created a more stable funding environment.  The abolition of 
entrance fees for Montana residents has also reduced collection costs.  During the year of 
implementation, the opt-out fee raised Parks Division revenue by 37.47 percent 
(Legislative Fiscal Division, 2009, 3).  However, despite the revenue generated by the 
opt-out fee, the Montana State Parks program continues to have funding issues.  While 
revenue has remained flat over the last few years, expenditures have continued to rise.  
The Montana opt-out fee has raised additional revenue for state parks but has not solved 
all funding problems of the state park system. 
Particularly during a time when states across the country are facing fiscal crises 
and General Fund support for state parks’ programs is being cut, funding solutions with 
the potential to generate large, independent streams of revenue for state parks systems are 
attractive.  The opt-out vehicle registration fee should be considered as a funding 
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alternative for public recreation financing, but several questions regarding political 
feasibility, efficiency, equity, and payment of the voluntary fee remain unanswered.  
Several states, such as Michigan, Arizona, California, and Washington have 
experimented with vehicle registration fees with varying levels of success.  Thus far, only 
the State of Washington has succeeded in implementing a similar system – a “donation” 
program during vehicle registration.  During vehicle registration, individuals are 
automatically signed up for a $5 donation unless they fill out paperwork to opt-out of the 
gift (Washington State Parks and Recreation Commission, 2009).  Initiatives in 
California and Michigan have not found traction in the political process; similar to the 
Montana experience, opt-out fees are seen as additional or hidden taxation.  Particularly 
with the current, prevailing anti-tax sentiment, alternative funding sources, when 
perceived as additional taxation, are less politically feasible to adopt. 
While significant research exists on the utilization of user fees in public 
recreation, there is little literature on the use of opt-out fees.  There are several 
differences between user fees and opt-out fees.  User fees provide a direct connection 
between the cost and benefit, and help to improve efficiency and equity concerns.  In 
contrast, opt-out fees act as more of a broad, quasi-tax and do not satisfy the efficiency 
concerns of connecting users to the full cost of the benefit or providing information for 
price setting.  Payment of the voluntary, opt-out fee is also perplexing.  Standard 
economic assumptions suggest that a rational individual would opt-out of the fee.  With 
the Montana opt-out fee, the system is non-exclusionary.  Provided that an individual has 
Montana license plates, s/he can enter state parks without the verification of payment, 
and this creates a “free rider” problem.  However, agency administrators and legislators 
33 
 
estimated that up to 50 percent of vehicle owners would pay the fee (Montana 
Legislature, 2004).   
Behavioral economics concepts such as the “salience effect,” which describes the 
impacts of fee complexity and convenience, could provide some insight into why 
individuals opt to pay a voluntary fee for a non-excludable good.  Congdon, Kling, and 
Mullainathan (2009) note that:  
…human frailties – procrastinating filling out a form, or being put off by the 
tediousness or hassle of completing it, or failing to understand program rules – 
can lead qualifying individuals to forgo benefits (379).  
   
If an opt-out fee is to be utilized as a major funding source for public recreation, thorough 
inquiry needs to be conducted to explore individual compliance with the voluntary fee.  
The revenue potential of an opt-out fee is tremendous, but more study is needed to 
determine if it is the most efficient and equitable method for generating revenue for 
public recreation.   
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